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FOUNDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
ECONOMIC INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN 







The United States’ sustained economic and geopolitical interest in 
the Arctic is dependent on Congressional funding and Executive 
support for icebreaking vessels and improved infrastructure in 
United States arctic territory. The United States has an interest in the 
Arctic and it is demonstrated by The Arctic Research and Policy Act 
of 1984 (amended 1990). Through the Act, the United States 
initiated research and policy development, with the supposition of 
potential economic benefits in the future. Due to verifiable and 
anticipated changes in ice density in the Arctic, the region is 
accessible like never before, and international competition for 
natural resources and commercial shipping lanes in the Arctic offer 
enormous economic benefits. The United States is woefully behind 
its international competitors due to a small and decrepit fleet of 
icebreaking vessels and crumbling arctic infrastructure. In 
examining The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 and multiple 
Arctic Strategy Plans that were published by federal agencies 
operating in the Arctic, it is clear —attention from Congress and the 
Executive must be redirected towards advancement. The first step 
to advancing the United States interest in the Arctic is by funding 




“The nature of maritime activity in the Arctic is indeed evolving 
from exploration and scientific research to resource extraction, 
commercial shipping, and a broad array of other pursuits.”2  
 
 
1 J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2020. 
2 THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY, 7 (2013). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Transpolar Passage, Northwest Passage (NWP), and 
Northeast Passage, also known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), 
are oceanic waterways that traverse the Arctic Ocean.3 These Arctic 
maritime routes are affected by the global trend in warming 
temperatures, which is likely to continue for decades, consequently 
reducing ice coverage.4 Although predictions vary with respect to 
how soon Arctic waters will be ice-free, researchers agree that 
between the years 2050 and 2060, ice coverage will be significantly 
reduced to the extent that commercial shipping lanes will be more 
accessible and navigable.5 Transnational commercial shipping 
through Arctic maritime routes will become viable alternatives to 
current Panama and Suez Canal routes. 6 The distance from source 
to terminal will be materially shorter,7 and the channels deeper, 
thereby accommodating ships of greater storage capacity.  In 
addition, huge quantities of oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, 
together with the world’s largest deposits of nickel, coal and zinc, 
are in the Arctic seabed and will become accessible for extraction.8  
 
3 Malte Humpert, The Future of the Northern Sea Route- A “Golden Waterway” 
or a Niche Trade Route, The Arctic Inst. (Sep. 15, 2011), 
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-northern-sea-route-golden-waterway-
niche/, [https://perma.cc/AB9U-LJAR]; See also Appendix 1. 
4 Scott R. Stephenson & Laurence C. Smith, Influence of Climate Model 
Variability on Projected Arctic Shipping Futures, 3 Earth’s Future 331, 331 
(2015), 
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2015EF000317, 
[https://perma.cc/RG4G-CKTS]; Jugal K. Patel & Henry Fountain, As Arctic Ice 
Vanishes, New Shipping Routes Open, N.Y. Times (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/03/science/earth/arctic-
shipping.html, [https://perma.cc/63VS-TQ67]; Garret W. Brass, U.S. ARCTIC 
RESEARCH COMM’N, THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
A SCENARIO FOR THE U.S. NAVY 1 (2002). 
5 See generally Stephenson & Smith supra note 3 at 331; see also Patel & 
Fountain, supra note 3; see also U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra 
note 3 at 1. 
6 Huiru Liu, Arctic Marine Insurance: Towards a New Risk Coverage Regiment, 
47 J. Mar. L. & Com. 77, 77 (2016); Alexander Proelss & Till Müller, The Legal 
Regime of the Arctic Ocean, 68 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 651, 653 (2008). 
7 Liu, supra note 5, at 77. 
8 James Kraska, From Pariah To Partner—Russian-American Security 
Cooperation in the Arctic Ocean, 16 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 517, 523 (2010). 
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The relationship between the Arctic region and the U.S. 
arose, in many ways, from an initial interest in establishing and 
cultivating U.S. presence and interest in the Arctic through research 
and policy development, with the supposition of potential economic 
benefits in the future.9 This intent was codified in The Arctic 
Research and Policy Act of 1984 (amended 1990) (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Act”). When the Act was proposed in the mid 
1980’s, the extent to which the Arctic would be impacted by global 
warming was, for the most part, unaccounted for by Congress. 
Today, there is significant research to substantiate the effects of 
global warming in the Arctic.10 As a result, the data from which 
Congress acted upon when drafting the Act is much different than 
what Congress knows now. Due to anticipated changes in ice 
density in the Arctic and the affect it will have on commercial 
activity in the Arctic region, the continued efficacy of the Act 
depends on two factors. First, Congress should ensure that the three 
icebreaking vessels planned for construction are built on schedule,11 
and they should also begin the processes of procuring additional 
icebreakers. Second, Congress, along with administrative agencies, 
and the States of Alaska and Maine, should work collaboratively to 
construct new and improved infrastructure to accommodate the 
anticipated commercial activity in the Arctic region.12  
 
 
9 S. REP. NO. 98-159, at 2 (1983) (Conf. Rep.)  
10 Charles H. Norchi & Paul A. Mayewski, The Arctic: Science, Law, and 
Policy, 22 The Ocean and Coastal L. J. 97, 100 (2017). 
11 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-600, 
COAST GUARD ACQUISITIONS POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM 
NEEDS TO ADDRESS RISKS BEFORE COMMITTING RESOURCES 
(2018). 
12 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND 
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC 
RESEARCH PROGRAMM PLAN 8 (2017), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/arcticgov-
static/publications/goals/usarc_goals_2017-2018_version_2.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/5T8X-U99V] (Infrastructure includes “ports, harbors, and 
places of refuge, aids to navigation, systems for search and rescue and for spill 
response, ice navigation training, navigation charts, communication systems, 
icebreakers, and ice centers.”). 
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Without additional vessels and infrastructure improvements, 
U.S. activity in the Arctic, and consequently, any interest the U.S. 
intended to gain in the Arctic economy, will be severely impaired. 
The following sections expand on this assertion. The beginning 
section examines the increasing financial and geopolitical 
opportunities in the Arctic region. Any U.S. interest in the Arctic 
economy is already in direct competition with other world powers; 
therefore, attention from Congress and the Executive must be 
redirected towards advancement. The next section analyzes the Act 
and its accompanying research and policy, which, at this point, is no 
longer sufficient to properly compete on a world-scale. While 
research and policy were significant components to the U.S. interest 
in the Arctic during the mid-1980s and early 1990s, it is clear that 
that will not create economic advancement. The next step to U.S. 
economic advancement in the Arctic is in the form of new 
icebreaking vessels and improved Arctic infrastructure. The final 
section addresses the, albeit, costly process for acquiring and 
initiating this development. While policy and research are 
important, we are moving into an era of documented and visible 
changes. The U.S. must effectively participate in the Arctic 
economy and the manner in which to begin is by constructing 
icebreaking vessels and Arctic infrastructure. 
 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN & 
COMMCERCIAL SHIPPING 
The Arctic Ocean is strategically important to the world for 
at least three reasons. First, the passageways (Transpolar, NWP, and 
NSR) that flow through the Arctic Ocean connect the eastern and 
western hemispheres;13 second, the natural resources located within 
the Arctic seabed are abundant;14 third, the region offers financial 
and geopolitical advantages to nations or private entities within 
those nations that can best leverage the shipping channels and 
natural resources of the Arctic. The three important elements are 




13 See Appendix 1. 
14 Kraska, supra note 7, at 523. 
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A.  Geography and Geopolitics in the Arctic 
 
The NWP runs above Canada, the NSR runs above Russia, 
and the Transpolar Sea Route runs directly through the center of the 
Arctic Ocean.15 The countries that have territory within the Arctic 
Circle include Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia, 
and the United States via Alaska.16 While not central to this 
comment, there are multiples legal disputes among Arctic countries 
that stem from claims of territorial ownership within Arctic waters.17 
These unsettled conflicts exacerbates the geopolitical complexities 
that surround the Arctic region and the sovereign Arctic border 
countries because territorial ownership equates to exclusive control 
and use of resources therein.  The governing law regarding the 
Arctic Ocean derives from the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS has not been 
ratified by the U.S., the U.S. does recognize international customary 
law.18 Customary law is essentially a tenant of international law and 
is a result of consistent practices of nation states which influences 
conduct and behavior due a sense of legal obligation to coordinate 
uniform behavior.19  As the U.S. Navy noted, despite not having 
ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has a sense of obligation to conform to 
the rules that pertain to territoriality of the seas, which are defined 
therein.20 Territorial seas are important to the countries that border 
the Arctic because, under UNCLOS, a territorial sea “basically 
functions as a continuation of the country’s land territory[,]” 
essentially affording full sovereignty.21 However, UNCLOS 
codifies the right of innocent passage for all ships to travel through 
the territorial seas of a coastal state so long as it is “peaceful, 
 
15 Id; Humpert, supra note 2. 
16 Stephanie Holmes, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic 
Sovereignty, 9 Chicago J. of Int’l L. 323, 326 (2008). 
17 See generally Proelss & Müller, supra note 5, at 655.  
18 Navy Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 3, 
13 (2014). 
19 Customary Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
20 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II § 1-2 art. 2-3, 
Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter UNCLOS].  
21 Holmes, supra note 14, at 326. 
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continuous, and expedient.”22 Those nations that may eventually 
gain exclusive control of additional territory in the Arctic, or the 
private entities of those nations, will likely realize benefits in the 
Arctic economy.  
 
B.  The Arctic Economy 
 
The Arctic economy is comprised of an abundance of natural 
resources, the commercial benefits and cost savings of maritime 
Arctic commerce, and foreign investment by countries like China 
and Russia, which have already begun to invest in the Arctic’s 
future.23 
 
1.  Natural Resources  
 
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that “the Arctic holds 
about thirteen (13) percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, thirty 
(30) percent of the undiscovered natural gas and twenty (20) percent 
of the undiscovered natural gas liquids.”24 That is approximately 
ninety (90) billion barrels of oil and forty-seven (47) trillion cubic 
meters of natural gas.25 The Arctic seabed also contains some of the 
 
22 Id. at 334. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, at Part II § 3 art. 17-19. See generally 
Ed Struzik, Full Speed Ahead Shipping Plans Grow as Arctic Ice Fades, YALE 
360 (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://e360.yale.edu/features/cargo_shipping_in_the_arctic_declining_sea_ice, 
[https://perma.cc/TT8M-N27F]; Caitlin O’Leary, Note/Comment, The New Ice 
Age: The Dawn of the Arctic Shipping and Canada’s Fight for Sovereignty over 
the Northwest Passage, 46 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 117, 119-20 (2014-
2015) (Russia, due to its geography, has an advantageous claim to territory in 
the Northeast Passage which gives it greater exclusive control over the NSR. 
While Canada claims the NWP as its sovereign territory, it is contested by the 
U.S. and China, which argue the NWP is an international strait. This debate is 
beyond the scope of this comment, but helpful when thinking about the 
geopolitics of the Arctic region that stem from territorial disputes.). 
23 Proelss & Müller, supra note 5, at 653; Clay Dillow, Russia and China vie to 
Beat the U.S. in the Trillion-Dollar Race to Control the Arctic, CNBC (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/russia-and-china-battle-us-in-race-to-
control-arctic.html, [https://perma.cc/FC89-37CE]. 
24 Kraska, supra note 7, at 523; Frank Ulmer, Alaska and the Arctic, 31 Alaska 
L. Rev. 161, 163 (2014). 
25 Kraska, supra note 7, at 523. 
2020] The Economic Interest of the United States in the Arctic 171 
 
world’s largest nickel, coal, and zinc deposits.26 In addition to 
natural minerals, the Arctic region also offers a fishing economy that 
will also develop as ice density is reduced.27 The natural 
commodities located in the Arctic are substantial to say the least. 
 
2.  Commercial Shipping   
 
The driving forces of the Arctic economy can be attributed 
not only to its natural resources,28 but also to its geography, which 
lends itself to advantageous commercial shipping because of shorter 
and deep water shipping routes by way of the NWP, NSR, and 
Transpolar Passage.29 Approximately ninety percent of all goods are 
shipped by sea.30 That is because shipping is “the cheapest form of 
transport[,]” and there is no indication that that will change in the 
near future.31 Moreover, because the “vast majority of active 
industrial production in the world . . . is concentrated . . . north of 
the [thirtieth] parallel[,] and about [seventy percent] of the world’s 
urban metropolitan areas are located north of the [twenty-third] 
parallel in the northern hemisphere[,]” the Arctic region is well-
situated to advance the world’s supply and demand chain.32  
 
Illustrative of the economy of shipping in the Arctic is the 
case of the Nordic Orion, which, in 2013, was the first commercial 
bulk carrier to sale through the Northwest Passage.33 By traveling 
 
26 Kraska, supra note 7, at 523; Dillow, supra note 21 (“[A] range of mineable 
minerals, including gold, silver, diamond, copper, titanium, graphite, uranium 
and other valuable rare earth elements” are “increasingly within reach” as ice 
melts). 
27 U.S. Artic Research Comm’n, supra note 3, at 1, 5. 
28 Dillow, supra note 21 (“The ultimate goal: to have offshore Arctic oil account 
for between 20 and 30 percent of Russian production by 2050.”). 
29 Id. See also Liu, supra note 5, at 77. 
30 Bruce G. Paulsen, What the General Litigator Needs to Know about Handling 





32 Liu, supra note 5, at 77. 
33 Wendy Stueck, Groundbreaking Northwest Passage voyage almost foundered 
over insurance, The Globe and Mail 
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through the Northwest Passage, as opposed to the Panama Canal, 
the Nordic Orion saved eighty thousand dollars in fuel cost, traveled 
one thousand nautical miles less, and the ship could carry about 
twenty-five percent more coal because the water was not as shallow 
as the Panama Canal.34 The Northwest Passage proved to be both 
advantageous and cost-effective. 
 
3.  Investing Countries 
 
As previously noted, Russia and China are beating “the U.S. 
in the [t]rillion-[d]ollar [r]ace to [c]ontrol the Arctic,”.35 Despite 
significant investment by other countries, such as Canada and some 
Nordic countries, Russia and China are the clear leaders.36 Russia 
has conducted commercial Arctic shipping since the first half of the 
twentieth century through the NSR as a way of connecting Russia’s 
isolated north to the rest of the country.37 Now, the NSR is 
“experiencing a renaissance.”38 This is in part because of China, 
which predicted that fifteen percent of its “annual trade would travel 
along Russia’s Northern Sea Route by 2020.”39 Given China’s 
rhetoric,40 and the fact that it is currently constructing an icebreaking 





[https://perma.cc/DV4P-G4VX] (last updated May, 11, 2018). 
34 Id. 
35 Dillow, supra note 21. 
36 Ásgeir Sigfússon, Getting into the Game: America’s Arctic Diplomacy, The 
Foreign Serv. J. Nov. 2015, 
http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping_book/1115/files/assets/basic-
html/page-23.html, [https://perma.cc/4BSA-EPJ3].   
37 Kraska, supra note 7, at 529. 
38 Id.  
39 Ryan Kilpatrick, China’s Plan for the Arctic—And A Shipping Centre to Rival 




41 U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR 
ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017) [https://perma.cc/3VKJ-4NK2]. 
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Despite China’s investment, which includes the new 
icebreaker, Russia is the world leader in icebreaker capability and 
subsequently, access to the Arctic Ocean.42 In Russia, icebreakers 
are used for many purposes, one of which is commercial. Russia has 
a fleet large enough “to reliably escort other [ships] through still 
periodically frozen waters, and that gives it massive influence over 
regional shipping patterns.”43 Russia also installed and revitalized 
ports along its NSR.44 In fact, Russia invested three hundred billion 
dollars “in potential projects either completed, in motion or 
proposed, [which makes] Russia . . . the clear leader in Arctic 
infrastructure development.”45 
 
 China, even without a territorial claim in the Arctic, is also 
heavily invested in the Arctic Ocean’s economic future. China’s 
president, Xi Jingping, announced China’s “ambitions to develop a 
‘Polar Silk Road’ through the region as warming global 
temperatures open up new sea lanes and economic opportunities at 
the top of the world.”46 China is using its economic strength to 
influence the region by “underwriting Arctic development 
projects.”47 Xi Jingping’s rhetoric indicates that China has “a keen 
interest in what the Arctic has to offer in terms of global shipping, 
fishing stocks, energy security and other mineral resources.”48 By 
incorporating the Arctic into their Belt and Road initiative, the 
Chinese government has taken “what is arguably the longest view 
in the region, using its financial might to secure access to resources 
it cannot obtain through territorial claims.”49  
 
42 See U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR 
ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017) [https://perma.cc/3VKJ-4NK2]; 
Kraska, supra note 7, at 529. 
43 Peter Apps, Commentary: The U.S. Risks Losing an Arctic Cold War, Reuters 
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://in.reuters.com/article/us-apps-arctic-
commentary/commentary-the-us-risks-losing-an-arctic-cold-war-
idINKBN1FJ2DM, [https://perma.cc/93DH-VDKC]. 
44 Sigfússon, supra note 34; Dillow, supra note 21. 
45 Dillow, supra note 21. 
46 Id.; Struzki, supra 20, at 2. 
47 Dillow, supra note 21. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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Based upon aforementioned developments in the Arctic 
region, the Arctic is a focus of financial investment and anticipated 
returns.50 The Arctic Ocean is poised for a flurry of new activity in 
the coming decades because natural resources, which were not 
available thirty to forty years ago, can now be extracted; 51 
additionally, commercial shipping and international competition are 
at the forefront of the Arctic economy in a manner that is drastically 
different than when the Act was passed. As one of the great nations 
of the world, the U.S. should have a significant role in the Arctic.52 
The economic prospects offered in the Arctic should encourage 
Congress to advance U.S. interest in the Arctic economy. This is 
especially true because increasing commercial activity will only 
strain the already minimal resources the U.S. has available in the 
Arctic.53  
 
50 Id. (“An inventory of planned, in-progress, completed, or canceled Arctic 
infrastructure projects compiled by global financial firm Guggenheim Partners 
tallies roughly 900 projects, requiring a total of $ 1trillion in investment, some 
of which is already on the way.”). 
51 Proelss & Müller, supra note 5, at 653; Ulmer, supra note 22 at 163 (“fishing . 
. . or oil and gas”). 
52 Ulmer, supra note 22, at 161(While outside the scope of this comment, but 
somewhat related to economic advancement, the U.S. should be concerned 
about mitigating risk in the Arctic region. Insurance management for Arctic 
shipping is another reason for the U.S. to be involved in the Arctic region, 
especially because regional economies in states like Alaska and Maine could be 
impacted by oil spills; See Liu, supra note 5, at 78 (“The Arctic is full of risks . . 
. Risk distribution among ships and shipowners is a key factor in the economic 
sustainability of world shipping.”); Struzik, supra note 20 (State economies, like 
that of Maine, which, due to its location, stand to benefit from Arctic sipping 
because it is the first port on the U.S. East Coast for ships traveling the shorter 
route from Asia to Europe. By using the Arctic Ocean, ships could save about 
ten days. Maine is in the process of improving its port, which is already home to 
Icelandic shipping company, Eimskip). 
53 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND 
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC 
RESEARCH PROGRAM PLAN 8, 15 (2017). 
https://storage.googleapis.com/arcticgov-
static/publications/goals/usarc_goals_2017-2018_version_2.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/ESA2-5JCP] (“U.S. vessels are aging and dwindling in number 
. . . Only one heavy icebreaker, USCG Polar Star, commissioned [forty] years 
ago, remains operational. USCG Healy, a medium icebreaker commissioned in 
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Before the Act came to fruition, Congress intended to create 
a comprehensive:  
 
national Arctic research policy in concert with a sustained 
research effort [to] allow the Nation to continue to develop 
the vast renewable and nonrenewable resources of the Arctic 
in an expeditious but responsible manner. A comprehensive 
Arctic research policy and a sustained research effort is also 
important to stated U.S. national security objectives . . . 
Research is important to the responsible development of 
Arctic resources, the meeting of important national security 
objectives, and the creation of a broad data base helpful to 
the resolution of a wide variety of current and future 
problems.54  
 
The Act envisioned a sustainable long-term approach to the 
Arctic region through research, data collection, and policy 
development. Now is the time for Congress to capitalize on these 
earlier efforts and recognize that the U.S. has an interest in the 
financial and geopolitical advancement of the Arctic region. 
However, without icebreaking vessels and improved infrastructure, 
the goals set out in the Act, which harken to sustainability and 
mitigation of long-term challenges, will not be achieved. The Act 
even acknowledges that the U.S. is inadequately equipped compared 
to other Arctic nations.55 While it was urgent for Congress to enact 
legislation pertaining to the Arctic in 1984, it is considerably more 
urgent that Congress reinvigorate U.S. interest in the Arctic.  
 
III. THE ARCTIC RESEARCH AND POLICY ACT OF 1984 (AMENDED 
1990) 
The purpose of the Act, among other things, is to delineate 
policy initiatives,56 centralize research and data collection,57 and 
 
1999, continues to operate successfully in the Arctic, effectively supporting a 
broad range of scientific missions.”). 
54 S. REP. NO. 98-159, at 2 (1983) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). 
55 15 U.S.C. § 4101(a)(10) (“most Arctic-rim countries possess Arctic 
technologies far more advanced than those currently available in the United 
States[.]”). 
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 4101-11. 
57 S. REP. NO. 98-159, supra note 52, at 14. 
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promote burden sharing in order to have more sustainable long-term 
development.58 The Act delineates several reasons for which Arctic 
interest is important, including the Arctic’s onshore and offshore 
energy resources; national defense; commercial assets; “security[;] 
economic[;] and environmental interests.”59 Essentially, the Act 
identifies the financial and geopolitical significance of the Arctic 
region.  
 
The import of the Act is belied in the collective efforts of 
federal agencies working toward a common interest of research and 
policy in the Arctic. The Act sets-out objectives for many U.S. 
agencies that operate in the Arctic.60 The Act established 
information sharing processes and collaboration through “an Arctic 
Research Commission [that] promote[s] [and recommends] Arctic 
research and . . . policy . . . [and] an Interagency Arctic Research 
Policy Committee [led by the National Science Foundation] to 
develop a national Arctic research policy and a five year plan to 
implement that policy.”61 The Act was followed by an Executive 
Order signed by president Reagan that aligned the executive’s 
interest in the Arctic with the legislature’s interest.62 
 
As prescribed by the Act, the Interagency Committee’s five-
year plan is the result of a collaborative effort made by the many 
agencies which function within the Arctic.63 The Plan is a tangible 
deliverable that is prepared for Congress and the Executive so that 
together, the U.S. government may continuously prepare future 
plans for U.S. involvement in the Arctic, which should now include 
 
58 See generally Id. at 2-20. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 4101(a)(1)-(3), (9).  
60 15 U.S.C. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L).. (The Interagency Committee is comprised of 
the National Science Foundation; The Departments of Commerce, Defense, 
Energy, the Interior, State, Transportation, and Health and Human Services; The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Environmental Protection 
Agency; Office of Science and Technology Policy; and “any other Executive 
agency that the Director of the National Science Foundation shall deem 
appropriate.”); see also Proclamation No. 12501, 50 Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 28, 
1985). 
61 15 U.S.C. § 4101(b)(1)-(3)  
62 Proclamation No. 12501, 50 Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 28, 1985) (The purpose was 
to “develop and recommend an integrated national Arctic research policy.”). 
63 See supra note 56; 15 U.S.C. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L).  
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an adequate fleet of icebreaking vessels and adequate infrastructure 
and personnel to service the increasing Arctic activity. 
 
Icebreaking vessels and port development serve two 
purposes that pertain to the Act and its reason for being. First, they 
allow the agencies who have congressionally defined duties to 
physically operate in the Arctic. The policies and data collected 
from those operations are incorporated into the Interagency Plan, 
which informs Congress and the Executive. The second purpose is 
to promote long-term development in the Arctic which can be 
realized by icebreakers and port development because they afford 
an opportunity to capitalize on both natural resources and maritime 
commerce in the Arctic, which should promote long-term growth in 
the region, if carried out sustainably.  
 
 While the next section addresses the Interagency Plan that 
was created pursuant to the Act, the analysis does not lie in the 
substance of what the goals are but rather how they can be achieved. 
The Plan makes it clear that for research to continue and long-term 
development plans to be achieved, icebreakers and port 
development are critical to the operations of federal agencies in the 
Arctic. 
 
A.  Analyzing the Arctic Research Plan Fiscal Year 2017-
2021 
 
The most recent Arctic Plan comes at a time when the 
climatic and commercial changes in the Arctic are imposing 
challenges to federal agencies carrying out congressionally 
mandated operations in the Arctic.64 The Plan is a comprehensive 
report built upon research and data collected by many federal 
organizations from the Interagency Committee.65 The current Plan 
 
64 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE 
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, ARCTIC RESEARCH PLAN FY2017-
2021 i-ii (2016). 
https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/uploads/cms/documents/iarpc_arctic_resear
ch_plan_2017-2021.pdf, [https://perma.cc/5Y72-AD8Q]. 
65 Id.at i-vi. 
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identifies challenges, and poses steps to alleviate those barriers in 
the form of goals, which are listed below. 
 
• Research Goal 1: Enhance understanding of health 
determinants and improve the well-being of Arctic 
residents.  
• Research Goal 2: Advance process and systems 
understanding of the changing Arctic atmospheric 
composition and dynamics and the resulting changes 
to surface energy budgets.  
• Research Goal 3: Enhance understanding and 
improve predictions of the changing Arctic sea ice 
cover.  
• Research Goal 4: Increase understanding of the 
structure and function of Arctic marine ecosystems 
and their role in the climate system and advance 
predictive capabilities. 
• Research Goal 5: Understand and project the mass 
balance of glaciers, ice caps, and the Greenland ice 
sheet and their consequences for sea level rise.  
• Research Goal 6: Advance understanding of process 
controlling permafrost dynamics and the impacts on 
ecosystems, infrastructure, and climate feedbacks.  
• Research Goal 7: Advance an integrated, landscape-
scale understanding of Arctic terrestrial and 
freshwater ecosystems and the potential for future 
change.  
• Research Goal 8: Strengthen coastal community 
resilience and advances stewardship of coastal 
natural and cultural resources by engaging in 
research related to the interconnections of people, 
natural, and built environments.  
• Research Goal 9: Enhance frameworks for 
environmental intelligence gathering, interpretation, 
and application toward decision support.66 
 
 
66 Id. at 1.  
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If unable to satisfy these goals, Arctic operations may be 
inhibited, which would limit sustained research and policy 
development, essentially rendering the Act ineffective. The Act 
highlights the importance of adapting in parallel to the identified 
changes to allow agencies to continue operating effectively. In other 
words, agencies must continuously adapt. An example of adaptation 
is through vessel and infrastructure construction which will allow 
for continued operations in the wake of new environmental 
challenges, which are currently inhibiting long-term, sustained, 
operations. Explicit in the Plan is that a “complete understanding of 
the Arctic System must include the human component.”67 Inherent 
in the human component is the Arctic economy.  
 
Each of the nine goals are affected by the increase in 
commercialization and human activity.68 The challenge in 
accomplishing these goals and performance elements is exacerbated 
by “commercial shipping, resource extraction and tourism[,]” which 
come as a result of “diminishing sea ice.”69 In fact, the ability to 
meet the Plan’s goals is arguably contingent on icebreakers, which 
are currently operating at reduced capacity in the U.S.,70 and port 
development because as commercialization continues in the Arctic, 
there will be continuous challenges that inhibit sustainable 
development and long-term interest in the Arctic, which could leave 
the U.S. in a state loss when compared to countries like Russia and 
China.  
 
 The Plan finds that an effort to meet the challenges brought 
on by commercialization is crucial because it directly impacts U.S. 
territory.71 For instance, diminishing sea ice may impact the people 
and the States of Alaska and Maine72 because of their geographic 
 
67 Id. at 4.  
68See generally Id. at 4.   
69 Id. at ii. 
70; see also U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, 
MAJOR ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017); NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, POLAR ICEBREAKERS IN A CHANGING WORLD 2 (2007). 
71 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE 
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at 3, n.5 (“About 30 
percent of Alaska lies within the Arctic Circle.”). 
72 Struzik, supra note 20. 
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proximity to the Arctic. This could also mean, as discussed in the 
prior section, “new opportunities for commercial and industrial 
development”73 in the form of “increased ship traffic for cargo and 
tourism.”74 The Plan’s goals recognize the challenges in the Arctic 
that are arising from the changing environment and 
commercialization of the region, and that infrastructure in the Arctic 
is no longer suitable.75 The challenges can be mitigated, however, 
by managing and influencing the influx of Arctic maritime traffic 
through research and policy, and by enabling greater access to the 
Arctic Ocean to enable exploration and commercial shipping 
traffic.76 The need for icebreaking vessels that can navigate the 
Arctic Ocean in all conditions is necessary. Moreover, as U.S. 
agencies begin to utilize new icebreakers to perform their 
operations, and modern infrastructure is developed to accommodate 
commercial activity in the harsh climate,77 more opportunity will be 
available to utilize U.S. Arctic territory, and neighboring territory, 
in ways that are similar to Russia.78  
 
The Plan essentially concludes that while research and 
policy are key to its purpose, the “human component” in the Arctic 
requires advancement in new resources, such as icebreakers and 
infrastructure. Not only does the Plan support this notion, but so too 
do the U.S. agencies who operate in the Arctic, each of which 
developed their own Arctic plans that are unique to the prerogatives 
of that agency. The following sub-sections analyze four independent 
plans for the Arctic. The plans were produced by the U.S. Arctic 
Research Commission, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, 
and the U.S. Coast Guard. Each of these organizations play an active 
role in the Interagency Arctic Research Committee. The individual 
plans permit us to better understand that each of these agencies 
 
73 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE 
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at 8. 
74 Id. at 19. 
75 Id. at 33 (“permafrost warming, degradation, and thaw subsidence can have 
significant implications for . . . infrastructure.”). 
76 See generally id. at 19-20. 
77 See generally id. at 33. 
78 Apps, supra note 41; Kraska, supra note 7, at 529. 
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contribute to the broader Plan and are interconnected by their Arctic 
operations. 
 
1.  The US. Arctic Research Commission Report79 
 
The role of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission is defined 
in the Act.80 The Commission is “composed of seven members 
appointed by the President, with the Director of the National Science 
Foundation serving as a nonvoting, ex officio member.”81 
Membership includes four individuals with academic or research 
expertise in the Arctic, one member who is an indigenous resident 
of the Arctic, and two representatives from private interest groups.82 
The terms are limited to a maximum of four years and vacancies are 
staggered,83 which allows for consistency between new and old 
members. Additionally, representatives of federal agencies involved 
in the Interagency Committee may be appointed to the Commission 
as observers to “report . . . and advise the Commission on the 
activities relating to Arctic research of their agencies.”84 The 
composition of the Commission leads to a multifaceted perspective, 
which allows for comprehensive reports and recommendations. The 
Commission makes recommendations through a report to Congress 
and the President, as directed by the Act, and cooperates with the 
State of Alaska to improve, facilitate, and manage the logistics of 
disseminating research plans and information.85 The Commission 
may also collect data and reports from other agencies, and may 
request assistance from the heads of the those agencies. All “Federal 
agencies shall consult with the Commission before undertaking 
 
79 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND 
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC 




80 15 U.S.C. § 4103.  
81 15 U.S.C. § 4102(b)(1).  
82 15 U.S.C. § 4102(b).  
83 15 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(2)(A)-(C).  
84 15 U.S.C. § 4102(d)(3).  
85 15 U.S.C § 4103.  
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major Federal actions relating to Arctic research.”86 The 
Commission, together with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy 
Committee shall prepare and submit an Arctic research plan to the 
President, who then transmits it to Congress.87 The plan “shall be 
revised biennially.”88 While the Commission significantly 
contributes to the Plan, the Commission also produces its own 
Arctic report. 
 
The Commission’s report is centered on the economic 
impact of the changing Arctic Ocean, and possible strategies that 
can be employed to induce positive environmental, ecological, and 
financial outcomes.89 In one regard, the report concludes that the 
Arctic is changing and the U.S. needs to engage in the Arctic in 
parallel with that change.90 a second conclusion is that because the 
Arctic is “rapidly and dramatically changing,”91 there are new 
challenges that are identified as potential barriers to effectuating 
effective research and policy initiatives. A base-level solution to 
dealing with the change is to ensure icebreakers and infrastructure 
are developed.92  
 
The report identified several challenges that specifically 
implicate port infrastructure and access to the Arctic Ocean by 
means of icebreaking vessels. The report found that “[c]ompromised 
infrastructure increases risks to human health, safety, and well-being 
and results in economic impacts on the scale of billions of dollars in 
Alaska alone.”93 The Commission refers to this type of 
 
86 15 U.S.C. § 41014 (c).  
87 15 U.S.C. § 4108.  
88 15 U.S.C. § 4108.  
89 See generally U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 77 at 1-16.  
90 Id. at 1. 
[T]he Arctic region is rapidly and dramatically changing, redefining 
life for people and communities, animals and plants, ecosystem 
functions, and landscapes. The present doesn’t look like the past, and 
the future will not look like the present, which makes it challenging for 
people to make choices about managing development and 
transportation, as well as land and water uses. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 8, 15. 
93 Id. at 8. 
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infrastructure as a “built environment,” (i.e. “a social science term 
that refers to the human-made surroundings and infrastructure that 
provide the setting for human activity, ranging in scale from 
buildings to cities and including supporting systems . . . for water, 
sewage, energy, communications, and transportation.”)94 
Considering all of the variables and requirements that are expected 
to ripple out from the increased commercial activity in the Arctic 
Ocean, updated and increased infrastructure is necessary if the U.S. 
is to accommodate commercial shipping in the Arctic region. If 
unable to accommodate the challenges, the U.S. will fail to realize 
the monetary benefits that narrowly accompany such 
accommodation.95 
 
 The Commission also identified several ways that the U.S. 
can support increasing maritime commerce in the Arctic, which 
includes implementation and enforcement of the International 
Maritime Organization’s Polar Code.96 Another way is to develop 
“adequate infrastructure, such as ports, harbors, and places of 
refuge, aids to navigation, systems for search and rescue and for spill 
response, ice navigation training, navigation charts, communication 
systems, icebreakers, and ice centers.”97 The U.S. icebreaking fleet 
and port infrastructure is currently undersized and outdated.98 A 
correlation with the lack of icebreaking vessels is perhaps an 
 
94 Id. 
95 Consider the earlier discussion regarding the advances that Russia has 
undertaken in the Arctic compared to those of the U.S. As the Arctic Ocean 
continues to experience reduced ice-coverage, the NWP and Transpolar Passage 
will be utilized more in Arctic shipping regimes, thus competing with Russia’s 
NSR, which is currently utilized more than other Arctic shipping routes because 
there is less ice coverage for longer periods of time. Russia is developing and 
revitalizing its own infrastructure to capitalize on the Arctic economy. As the 
Commission’s plan noted, new environmental challenges will expose outdated 
infrastructure.  
96 THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY 17 (2013). 
97 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 77, at 8. 
98 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GOALS AND 
OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 2017-2018 FOR THE U.S. ARCTIC 
RESEARCH PROGRAMM PLAN 15 (2017) (“U.S. vessels are aging and 
dwindling in number . . . Only one heavy icebreaker, USCG Polar Star, 
commissioned [forty] years ago, remains operational. USCG Healy, a medium 
icebreaker commissioned in 1999, continues to operate successfully in the 
Arctic, effectively supporting a broad range of scientific missions.”). 
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explanation as to why there is inadequate mapping of the Arctic 
Ocean region. In fact, “less than [five percent] of U.S. Arctic 
maritime waters (those within [two hundred] nautical miles of 
Alaska shorelines in the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas) have 
been mapped by modern methods.”99  Additionally, “[i]cebreaking 
vessels are essential to conducting world-class research in the Arctic 
Ocean. Without that capacity, the ability to answer challenging 
scientific questions becomes impossible.”100 The need for 
icebreakers and improved infrastructure is readily apparent to the 
Arctic Commission. The Commission also recognized that “the time 
required to design, build, and commission a vessel can take years, if 
not a decade.”101 This makes the timing of procuring these vessels 
even more crucial.  
 
 The Commission identified the importance of revitalized 
infrastructure and icebreaking vessels as significant components to 
enhancing economic and human opportunities in the Arctic. The 
Commission’s efficacy is also dependent on these improvements 
because without improved infrastructure and icebreakers, the 
statutorily defined duties of the Commission become increasingly 
difficult to achieve.102 While the Commission’s report was prepared 
for, and utilized by, other actors with Arctic interests, the 
Commission has legally binding responsibilities. Without improved 
infrastructure and icebreaking vessels, the commission cannot carry 
out its duties and the Act becomes ineffective. the purpose of the 
Commission and the Act are likely to be ineffective. The next 
section examines the challenges the Arctic poses to the U.S. Navy’s 
duties in the Arctic, and the ways in which icebreakers and 
infrastructure can mitigate those challenges.   
 
2.  The U.S. Navy Arctic Plan (2014-2030) 
 
The Navy, which is organized under the Department of 
Defense (“DOD”), also produced an Arctic plan, and the DOD is 
 
99 U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM’N, supra note 77, at 8. 
100 Id. at 15. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 17. 
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also a party to the Interagency Committee.103 The Navy’s 
perspective on the Arctic is different from the Commission’s 
because the Navy’s objectives are focused on maritime defense and 
security. The Navy’s strategic plan includes a long-term impact 
assessment of the environmental challenges in the Arctic region, the 
increased commercial and human activity in the Arctic and its 
geopolitical landscape. While the Navy’s objectives in the Arctic 
differ from the objectives of the Commission, the Navy would also 
benefit from icebreaking capabilities and enhanced port 
infrastructure to service its maritime activity in the Arctic.  
 
The Navy’s mandated objectives in the Arctic are, in part, to 
“[e]nsure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland 
defense; [p]rovide ready naval forces to respond to crisis [sic] and 
contingencies; [p]reserve freedom of the seas; and [p]romote 
partnerships within the United States Government and with 
international allies and partners.”104  
 
However, as a result of “retreat[ing] . . . sea ice[,]” new 
challenges, such as increased navigability and use by both Arctic 
and non-Arctic nations because of the “abundant resources and trade 
routes,”105 impede efforts to satisfy the Navy’s objectives.106 The 
Navy’s objectives include:  
 
a global responsibility to protect vital sea lanes and operating 
areas, including defending the Nation’s maritime borders 
and [Exclusive Economic Zones]. The geostrategic 
importance of the Bering Strait will increase as resource 
extraction, shipping, fishing, and tourism increases. The 
Navy will be forward deployed and prepared to protect 
United States’ maritime access and interests as the Arctic 
Ocean sea lanes begin to open.107 
 
 
103 15 U.S.C.S. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-243). 
104 NAVY TASK FORCE CLIMATE CHANCE, U.S. NAVY ARCTIC 
ROADMAP 2014-2030, 3 (2014). 
105 Id. at 3. 
106  Id. at 3. (see comment above) 
107 Id. at 17. 
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According to the Navy, the Arctic Ocean’s overall 
navigability is effected when more entities, whether public or 
private, utilize shorter shipping lanes to exploit or extract resources. 
As a result, there is more pressure on the Navy. Moreover, the 
extraction and exploitation of “oil and gas development, fishing, 
tourism, and mineral mining could alter the region’s strategic 
importance as Arctic and non-Arctic nations make investments.”108 
This competition could be a divisive factor in international relations. 
The Navy, which has global responsibility to peaceably facilitate 
this interaction, especially when it affects U.S. territory, will need 
to enhance operations to protect and secure U.S. territory.109  
 
Other challenges to the Navy’s objectives include the sheer 
size of the Arctic region, which “covers an area of about 5.4 million 
square miles, almost 1.5 times the size of the United States.”110 This 
geographic challenge requires enhanced monitoring, enforcement, 
and preparation. There is also the challenge posed by “a harsh 
climate . . . and little infrastructure[,]” all of which inhibits the 
Navy’s ability to operate successfully in the Arctic region.111  
 
While the Navy is not specifically referenced in the Act, its 
connection to the Arctic region is clear, and the policy and research 
carried out by the Navy was specifically considered in the 
Interagency Plan.112 The Navy, while not acting pursuant to the Act, 
is nonetheless influential in contributing to research and policy in 
the Arctic. Furthermore, the Navy’s conduct in the Arctic “[t]hrough 
ongoing exercises, such as Ice Exercise . . . and Scientific Ice 
Expeditions . . . research, and transits through the region”113 
coincides with the conduct carried out by other U.S. agencies acting 
in direct accordance with the Act. The Navy’s ability to meet its 
objectives is challenged by the increased commercial activity, which 
ultimately affects international relations. Similar to the research 
 
108 Id. at 3. 
109 Id. at 17. 
110 Id. at 6. 
111 Id. at 3. 
112 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE 
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at 15. 
113 Navy Task Force Climate Change, supra note 16, at 18. 
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conducted by the Commission, the Navy’s research and policy 
indicates that icebreaking vessels and improved arctic infrastructure 
are necessary for the Navy to meet its ongoing objectives and protect 
U.S. interests in the Arctic. 
 
3.  Department of Defense (“DOD”) Arctic Plan 
 
The DOD’s operations extend to the Arctic Ocean not only 
because they are a member of the Interagency Committee,114 but 
also because, like the Navy, the DOD, through its agents, is tasked 
with defending and securing the U.S. A significant challenge the 
DOD faces due to the changing Arctic icescape includes 
maintaining “[a]dequate domain awareness[,]” which is an essential 
component of protecting maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, 
and key resources.”115 Due to the ongoing and rapid changes in 
maritime commerce, which is spurred by reduced ice coverage, 
providing enhanced security and defense have become challenged 
by the “broad spectrum of activities, ranging from resource 
extraction and trade to activities supporting safe commercial and 
scientific operations to national defense.”116 The DOD’s mission to 
defend and secure is complicated by an expanding region due to ice 
melt and expanded human activity that is accompanying commercial 
opportunities. While the DOD is taking a fiscally conservative 
approach in its Arctic Plan, in terms of restraint towards new 
infrastructure development117 and premature investment in new 
technologies,118 the challenges that DOD identified could 
nonetheless be alleviated by new infrastructure and icebreaking 
vessels, despite the cost.  
 
The physical presence of icebreakers and infrastructure in 
the Arctic, while perhaps not identified as critical to accomplish the 
 
114 15 U.S.C.S. § 4106(b)(2)(A)-(L) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-243). 
115 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ARCTIC STRATEGY, 9 (2013). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 10 (“solutions for associated supporting infrastructure requirements 
should seek to leverage existing U.S. Government, commercial, and 
international facilities to the maximum extent possible in order to mitigate the 
high cost and extended timelines associated with the development of Arctic 
infrastructure.”).  
118 Id. at 12.  
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DOD’s security objectives, would certainly ease their ability to do 
so, would also reduce reliance on foreign countries who have greater 
Arctic capabilities;119 and would also  further the objectives 
described in the Act. As the Arctic changes, and invariably new 
challenges confront the U.S., the pressure on DOD to meet its own 
objectives, while also assisting other U.S. agencies, will increase. 
Although DOD’s objectives in the Arctic region differ from the 
goals described in the Interagency plan, there is a long-term mutual 
benefit that can be realized if the Plan’s goals are fulfilled because 
it will enhance and stabilize U.S. interest in the Arctic, which can 
ease pressure on the DOD.  
 
4.  U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy  
 
Although the Coast Guard is not specifically mentioned in 
the Act, it is represented in the U.S. Interagency Plan through the 
Department of Homeland Security,120 which subsumes the U.S. 
Coast Guard.121 While the Coast Guard’s objectives are similar to 
those of the DOD, and the U.S. Navy, they also differ. The Coast 
Guard’s statutorily defined objectives include “search and rescue 
operations, securing the maritime border, collecting critical 
intelligence, responding to potential disasters and protecting the 
marine environment.”122 The Coast Guard, similar to DOD and the 
U.S. Navy, anticipates a variety of challenges to its ability to carry 
out its objectives due to the Arctic Ocean’s reduced ice coverage.123 
The Coast Guard’s Arctic Plan offers a thorough analysis of the 
many challenges it faces because of increased commercial activity. 
Moreover, the Coast Guard offers the most compelling evidence in 
 
119 Id. at 10 (“Security cooperation activities and other military-to-military forms 
of engagement establish, shape, and maintain international relations and the 
partnerships necessary to meet security challenges and reduce the potential for 
friction.”). 
120 INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POL’Y COMMITTEE OF THE 
NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNSIL, supra note 62, at v. 
121 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, at 1. 
122 THE UNITED STATES COASTGUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY, 9 (2013). 
123 Id. at 34 (“[O]il and gas, shipping, fishing, mining, logging, adventure 
tourism, and renewable energy . . . [are] increasing human activity in the Arctic. 
As these activities increase there will be a corresponding demand for the Coast 
Guard to exercise all of its mission sets in the region.”). 
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support of icebreaker procurement and port development in the 
Arctic. The Coast Guard’s emphatic call for investment and vessel 
rehabilitation perhaps lies in the fact that the current heavy 
icebreaking fleet is owned and operated by the Coast Guard itself.124 
Arctic research and policy is dependent on functioning icebreakers 
and infrastructure.125 The Coast Guard’s pivotal role in the Arctic 
makes it a critical organization whose own ability to fulfill their 
objectives causes a significant effect to the objectives of the Act. 
 
The Coast Guard identified multiple driving factors that 
impact its ability to carry out its objectives. The first challenge 
comes in the form of “trans-shipment of cargo through the Arctic 
region[,]” which has already increased.126 Increased shipping in the 
coming years due to reduced ice density allows for longer periods 
of time in which commercial shipping through the Arctic is 
viable.127 Longer thawing periods and warmer temperatures equate 
to “[e]conomic development, in the forms of resource extraction, 
adventure tourism, and trans-Arctic shipping.”128 The global 
commercial investment in the Arctic region, specifically Chukchi 
and Beaufort Sea, totaled $3.7 billion since 2005.129 With more 
investment and infrastructure, the more maritime activity there will 
be.130 The Coast Guard must adapt to meet new challenges within 
the Arctic region in order to carry out its objectives among the 
multitude of other players. 
 
 Increased maritime activity will also affect the safe passage 
of commercial vessels. In regard to ensuring safe maritime passage 
in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is particularly concerned with the 
risks to ships and their crews because of “[e]xtensive distances, 
extreme weather, and scarcity of physical infrastructure [which] 
present logistical challenges [that] . . . accentuate the challenges of 
routine operations or response to major contingencies in the 
 
124 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 68, at 1. 
125 THE UNITED STATES COASTGUARD, supra note 121, at 35. 
126 Id. at 7. 
127 Id. at 9. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 13. 
130 Id. at 17. 
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Arctic.”131 The lack of infrastructure in the Arctic, and the 
increasing human activity from commercial shipping creates more 
safety risks, and generates concern surrounding the ability to carry 
out search and rescue operations in the region, thereby potentially 
jeopardizing human lives.132 
 
 The Coast Guard is also tasked with ensuring safety and 
cleanliness in the Arctic environment. “Expanding maritime 
activities in the Arctic require increased presence, oversight, 
regulatory enforcement, and contingency response.”133 Regulations 
must be enforced, and the Coast Guard must be equipped with 
resources to clean-up after, what is almost inevitable, environmental 
disasters. This is critical in the Arctic region because “more than 50 
percent of America’s fish stock comes from the Nation’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) off [the coast] of Alaska.”134 Pollution in the 
Arctic has the potential to cripple a significant U.S. economy. 
Pollution or harm to the environment is not limited to oil spills but 
can also arise because of “efforts to discover and exploit offshore oil 
and gas reserves.”135 
 
 Preserving the environment for its own sake is important, but 
it is doubly so when there is a significant economy attached to its 
health. “The Bering Sea remains home to one of the world’s richest 
biomasses and is currently the only sustainable fishery in U.S. Arctic 
waters . . . If fish stocks begin to migrate north, commercial fishing 
interest will surely follow, which could lead to increased foreign 
incursions into the U.S. EEZ in the Arctic Ocean .”136 The Coast 
Guard is tasked with difficult objectives, and the harsh conditions 
create more challenges that make it difficult for the Coast Guard to 
be effective, if not given the appropriate resources. The Coast 
Guard’s identification of these challenges indicates that there are 
also likely to be areas where further research and policy 
 
131 Id. at 14. 
132 Id. at 14, 20. 
133 Id. at 21. 
134 Id. at 7. 
135 Id. at 22 (“[T]he energy industry will deploy oil rigs, offshore supply vessels, 
barges, and tankers in Arctic waters” all of which has hazardous risks to 
environmental safety.). 
136 Id. at 28. 
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development will be necessary until they are no longer considered 
challenges.  
 
 Another challenge that arises from the changing 
environment and commercialization of the region is the issue of 
enforcement of international or multilateral treaties and agreements 
that govern conduct in the Arctic. This challenge is exacerbated by 
the “number of non-Arctic nations and non-state organizations [that 
plan to] . . . engage in Arctic maritime activity.”137 As more private 
and public organizations utilize the Arctic Ocean  for their own 
purposes the more of a strain on, but need for, diplomatic relations 
in the Arctic Ocean. The Coast Guard, as a law enforcement entity 
with a physical presence in the Arctic Ocean will play a significant 
role when it comes to enforcing international treaties and 
agreements.  
 
Some of the important international treaties, declarations, 
and organizations that the U.S. abides by, which are enforced by the 
Coast Guard, include United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (“UNCLOS”),138 The Illulissat Declaration,139 The Ottawa 
Declaration of 1996 (which established the Arctic Council),140 and 
the International Maritime Organization.141 With respect to 
 
137 Id. at 17. 
138 Id. at 14 (“The United States is not a party to [UNCLOS] but accepts and acts 
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention relating to traditional uses 
of the oceans – such as navigation and overflight – as reflective of customary 
international law and practice.”).  
139 Id. at 14 (The Illulissat Declaration states in part: “‘the law of the sea 
provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, 
including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, 
and other uses of the sea.’ Also, signatory nations remain committed to this legal 
framework and see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal 
regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”). 
140 Id. at 14 (“The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 established the Arctic Council as 
a high-level, consensus-based intergovernmental forum for cooperation in the 
Arctic. While not a governing body, the Arctic Council provides the primary 
institutional framework for international Arctic issues.”). 
141 Id. at 14-15  
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a United Nations 
specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of 
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. All Arctic 
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maritime governance, the Coast Guard has vital responsibilities to 
maintain international governance and represent U.S. interest in 
shaping maritime governance and policy in the Arctic region, all of 
which will affect the U.S. and its ability to capitalize on the Arctic 
economy.  
 
Challenges to Arctic policy development is influenced by 
international cooperation. The Coast Guard must have the ability to 
contribute to international efforts in order to contribute to Arctic 
policy. Now, “[l]imited operational resources and expanding 
maritime risks underline the need for increasing collaboration in the 
region.”142 The Coast Guard must have the ability to maintain U.S.’s 
commitments to maritime governance as laid out in and by the 
treaties and governing organizations. To maintain mutually 
beneficial relationships that are “essential for mission success” In 
the Arctic economy.143 Mutually beneficial international 
collaboration is exemplified by the Coast Guard’s ability to 
“[l]everag[e] international information-sharing arrangements.”144 
 
The Coast Guard’s Arctic strategy for the coming years 
involves an effort to make-up for shortfalls, which include, among 
other things “the need for additional icebreakers and long-range 
patrol vessels. . . [as well as] infrastructure investments.145 These 
resources are critical to the Coast Guard’s success in the Arctic 
because they afford the Coast Guard an opportunity to effectively 
satisfy the long-term objectives in the Arctic, which has an ancillary 
impact on research and policy initiatives. As the Act so highlighted, 
U.S. interest in the Arctic was to have a long-term view on 
sustainable practices, the Coast Guard has identified adequate 
vessels and infrastructure as key resources that allow the Coast 
Guard to navigate the huge territory and carry-out its missions 
effectively over the course of the current and distant future. 
 
States are members of the IMO. In 2009, the IMO agreed to develop a 
mandatory Polar Code that would offer construction, operating, and 
environmental guidelines for shipping through polar waters.  
142 Id. at 22. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 24. 
145 Id. at 36. 
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Congress should approve funding for vessels and infrastructure 
because “[e]ffective maritime presence is essential to improving 
awareness and ensuring safe, secure, and environmentally 
responsible maritime activity in Arctic waters . . . Presence also 
enable adequate enforcement of vessel routing regimes and 
compliance with safety, security, and environmental laws and 
treaties.”146 Moreover, these resources will ensure continued future 
success for U.S. agencies operating in the Arctic. 
 
A.  Consequential Results of Inaction 
 
The Arctic serves as a vital region to advance U.S. economic 
and geopolitical interest. This was realized when the Act was first 
considered, and, is in part, the reason for its enactment. The Arctic 
economy is ripe for engagement, and the U.S. must act before other 
world powers establish control and leave the U.S. in a position in 
which it cannot benefit. While research and policy were necessary 
and critical components to the U.S. interest in the Arctic region 
when the Act was initially considered and enacted, the current 
atmosphere is significantly different. If U.S. interest is to advance, 
the U.S. must set-out new initiatives, which must include 
icebreaking vessels and improved arctic infrastructure. These 
resources can overcome the many challenges that are illustrated in 
the Interagency Plan, as well as the additional individual Arctic 
policy plans produced by the U.S. Arctic Commission, Navy, DOD, 
and Coast Guard. Without additional icebreakers and improved 
arctic infrastructure, Congress cedes U.S. interest in the Arctic 
economy to the rest of the world because the U.S. agencies will 
simply be unable to compete and fulfill their responsibilities 
effectively. 
 
IV. NEXT STEPS FOR ICEBREAKERS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Fortunately, the U.S. Congress is making the appropriate 
steps to advance U.S. interest in the Arctic economy into the future 
by appropriating spending money to the Department of Homeland 
 
146 Id. at 26.  
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Security and the Navy to begin the acquisition of three Heavy Polar 
Icebreakers.147 Additionally, Senator Lisa Murkwoski sponsored a 
Bill, entitled the Shipping and Environmental Arctic Leadership 
Act, S. 3740, 115th Cong. (2017-2018), which proposes actionable 
initiatives to develop sustainable infrastructure in the Arctic region. 
The proposed Bill seeks to accommodate the increasing maritime 
navigation in the Arctic region.148 Senator Murkowski’s legislation 
is also noteworthy because it is financially sustainable and uses 
infrastructure to benefit the U.S. economy. 149 Although the Bill has 
not gained the necessary support to advance through the Senate, 
there is at least progression in acquiring three new heavy polar 
icebreakers. 
 
A.  Heavy Polar Icebreaker Acquisition  
 
Although not mentioned in the Commission’s report, the 
U.S.’s position in the world when it comes to an icebreaking fleet is 
outranked by countries like Russia, Canada, Finland and Sweden. 
The U.S. has eight icebreakers of varying classes, however, three of 
those eight are only planned, another is entirely inoperable, yet still 
counted, and another one is not owned by a U.S. agency, but a 
private company that leases to the NSF.150);151 Russia comes in first 
with forty-six icebreaking vessels of varying size and capability 
(eleven of which are under construction and four of which are 
 
147 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, 
COAST GUARD ACUISITIONS POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM NEEDS 
TO ADDRESS RISKS BEOFRE COMMITTING RESOURCES (2018). 
148 Shipping and Environmental Arctic Leadership Act, S. 3740, 115th Cong. 
§2(4) (2017-2018) (“investment in infrastructure for shipping routes, ice breaker 
service and refuge, ports, spill prevention and response, salvage, and LNG 
[Liquefied Natural Gas] bunkering, would be collectively beneficial for all 
associated states, the environment, and global commerce.”). 
149 Id. at § 2(13). Shipping and Environmental Arctic Leadership Act, S. 3740, 
115th Cong. 
150 RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34391, COAST 
GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
FOR CONGRESS 6 (2018); see generally U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF 
WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR ICEBREAKERS OF THE 
WORLD (2017). 
151 U.S.C.G. OFFICE OF WATERWAYS & OCEAN POLICY, MAJOR 
ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD (2017). 
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planned);152 and ending in a six-way tie for last, are six countries 
with one icebreaker of varying size.153 The class size of an 
icebreaker indicates the vessels ability to break through varying 
degrees of dense ice.154 When it comes to the current acquisition 
process in the U.S., the three icebreakers are to be “heavy polar 
icebreakers,”155 which afford navigating through the most dense ice. 
 
Having this icebreaking capability is crucial to carrying out 
U.S. interest in the Arctic region. The responsibilities of U.S. polar 
icebreakers are immense. They are summarized here:  
 
Conduct[] and support[] scientific research in the 
Arctic and Antarctic; defending U.S. sovereignty in 
the Arctic by helping to maintain a U.S. presence in 
U.S. territorial waters in the region; defending other 
U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic 
interests in waters that are within the U.S. exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska; monitoring 
sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the 
United States; and conducting other typical Coast 
Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law 
enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in 
Arctic waters, including U.S. territorial waters north 
of Alaska.156 
 
Congress was essentially forced to decide to either advance U.S. 
interest in the Arctic or not. The decision to appropriate money from 
the apparent challenges generate by increased commercial 
 
152  Id. 
153 Id. 
154 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 68, at 57. Class 
classification can vary in different countries because the class is based on a 
regulatory scheme common to that country. See Id. The Polar Code recently 
published by the IMO is an effort to bring some uniformity to this process when 
it comes to maritime navigation in the Arctic. See generally IMO, 
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN POLAR WATERS 
(POLAR CODE) (2017). 
155 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, Supra note 7, at 1. 
156 RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 1-2. 
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navigation in the Arctic, which will require some level of support 
from U.S. icebreakers;157 as well as “the Coast Guard’s 
[questionable] ability to ensure year-round access to the Arctic . . . 
with the current fleet [which could negatively] . . . affect U.S. 
economic, maritime, and national security interests in these 
regions.”158 
 
 Due to the overall expected cost of the icebreaker program, 
which includes the lifecycle of the three planned polar icebreakers, 
the money could obviously not all be appropriated in one budget 
cycle. The total lifecycle cost estimated by the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and the Navy was $9.8 billion, 
however, according to the Government Accountability Office, this 
number may increase.159 Since this acquisition process is so 
expensive, “[t]he Coast Guard and the Navy established the IPO 
[Integrated Program Office] to collaborate and develop a 
management approach to acquire three HPIBs [Heavy Polar Ice 
Breaker].”160 The IPO allows the Coast Guard and Navy, two federal 
agencies that are likely to be most reliant on icebreakers because of 
their duties, to combine funds to jointly purchase the icebreakers. 
“The IPO has responsibility for managing and executing the HPIB’s 
acquisition schedule, acquisition oversight reviews, budget and 
communications, and interagency coordination.”161 The IPO is 
spearheading the acquisition process using appropriations 
earmarked for the icebreaker program, which was initiated by the 
 
157 Id. at 2. 
158 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 1. 
159 Id. at “GAO Highlights” Page. 
160 Id. at 7. 
161 Id.; see also RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34391, COAST GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER PROGRAM: 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 12 n.32 (2018). 
These agreements [between the Navy and CG] state that the 
program will follow DHS acquisition policies with DHS 
leadership serving as the acquisition decision authority for 
program milestones. However, the navy will review and 
approve acquisition documents before the program seeks DHS 
approval. These agreements also state that the program’s 
contracting actions could be funded by either USCG or Navy 
appropriations, and the source of the appropriations will award 
the contract. 
2020] The Economic Interest of the United States in the Arctic 197 
 
Coast Guard in their FY2013 budget.162 The Coast Guard was 
subsequently “authorized to use incremental funding for the HPIB. 
This authorization is reflected in the Coast Guard’s January 2018 
affordability certification memo.”163 
 
 The acquisition process for the first heavy polar icebreaker 
is currently underway.164 “In March 2018, the Navy released the 
solicitation for a contract to design and construct up to three HPIBs. 
The Navy indicated that it anticipates awarding the contract in the 
third quarter of fiscal year 2019 with $270 million in Navy funding 
that Congress has appropriated for the program.”165 In conjunction 
with the Coast Guard’s FY2019 budget,166 the goal is to have the 
first heavy polar icebreaker “enter service in 2023.”167 While this is 
the first step, there are many variables that can impede this process 
and increase the cost.168 The ultimate goal, which “envisages the 
acquisition of three new heavy polar icebreakers, to be followed 
years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar 
icebreakers”169 is still in the distant undefined future. 
 
 
162 RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 11. 
163 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 47; 
see also Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-120, § 207 
(Feb. 8, 2016). 
164 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 46 
(“The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 authorized 
procurement of one Coast Guard heavy polar icebreaker vessel.” See Pub. L. No. 
115-91, § 122(a), (b).).  
165 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 1; 
See also Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. C, 
Title III (Mar. 23, 2018); Consolidated Appropriations Act 2017, Pub. L. 115-
31, Div. C., Title III (May 5, 2017). 
166 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra note 7, at 46 
(The Coast Guard originally requested $30 million, but “[s]ubsequently, after 
discretionary budget caps were relaxed by Congress, the Administration’s fiscal 
year 2019 budget addendum requested an additional $720 million in fiscal year 
2019 Coast Guard appropriations for the program.”). 
167 RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 11. 
168 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-600, supra 
note 7. (“unplanned changes to the [IPO’s] scope and any corresponding funding 
requests for unanticipated cost growth would require discussions and 
agreements with both Coast Guard and Navy leadership.” Id. at 49.).  
169 RONALD O’ROURKE, supra note 134, at 11. 




There is undisputed evidence that global warming is 
deleteriously effecting ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean. As a result 
of this environmental cataclysm, the Arctic economy is expanding. 
Natural resources that were once unavailable are now accessible, 
and commercial shipping through the Arctic Ocean’s three main 
routes is more viable and more cost effective than traditional 
commercial maritime routes. Because the Arctic economy promises 
economic advantages, the Arctic is seeing billions of dollars in 
investment money. It is important that the U.S. contribute to the 
Arctic economy, but currently, however, U.S. involvement is 
limited. 
 
 The U.S. interest in the Arctic was codified in the Arctic 
Research and Policy Act, which focused on long-term development 
in the Arctic, with the intention of realizing an economic benefit 
therein. The Act mandated continuous research and policy 
initiatives through a network of federal agencies. That research and 
policy culminates in a regularly produced plan that includes goals 
that further advance U.S. interest in the Arctic. The degree in which 
the Arctic environment has changed since the Act was implemented 
is immense, and the opportunities presented by the Arctic economy 
seem to be greater than what Congress originally envisioned. The 
U.S. is now in a position where it cannot adequately compete with 
other countries that are investing in the Arctic economy because 
U.S. agencies are not equipped with the necessary resources. The 
U.S. only has one fully operational heavy polar icebreaker and the 
infrastructure in its Arctic territory is deficient. These resources will 
continue to be stressed because of increasing human activity in the 
Arctic, which is a result of the expanding Arctic economy. This 
assertion is substantiated by data from both the Plan, and the four 
federal agencies examined above. The human activity is a challenge 
to maintaining effective and essential operations in the Arctic. There 
is now an immediate need for icebreaking vessels and improved 
infrastructure to not only support operations, but to reinvigorate 
sustained U.S. interest in the Arctic region. 
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 Congress must act now if the U.S. is to compete with other 
world powers such as China and Russia, which are expanding their 
interests in the Arctic economy at a rapid pace. While acquisition of 
the three heavy polar icebreakers is a crucial first-step, more must 
be done. Congress should initiate the procurement of additional 
icebreakers, and begin infrastructure improvement projects as 
identified in Senator Murkowski’s proposed legislation. These steps 
are necessary if the U.S. is to capture the original intent of the Act, 
which is long-term, sustained, development for the purpose of 
capturing economic benefits in the Arctic.  
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